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Steffel: Time Between Theft and Injury

THE TIME BETWEEN THE THEFT AND THE INJURY: STANDING
REQUIREMENTS BASED ON A FUTURE RISK OF IDENTITY
THEFT AFTER A DATA BREACH
Jameson Steffel

I. INTRODUCTION
A single data breach has the ability to affect billions of accounts at one
time.1 In 2018 alone, data breaches exposed over 446 million consumer
records containing personally identifiable information (“PII”).2 Although
the numbers may already seem staggering, some believe the risk will
likely increase and worsen going forward as reliance on online record
keeping increases.3 Unsurprisingly, as data breaches occur, victims bring
lawsuits, hoping to remedy damages. Corporate spending on class action
lawsuits has increased to its highest level since 2008.4 Within the trend,
many in the field believe data privacy and security will bring the next
wave of class action suits.5
As the legal attention surrounding data and security has increased,
federal courts are split on when a victim of a data breach has standing to
sue in federal court. Federal courts generally agree that someone whose
identity was stolen and wrongfully used after their PII was exposed in a
data breach has standing to sue.6 However, federal courts are split over
whether risk of future identity theft alone is enough to grant standing in

1. Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affect by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billionusers.html?module=inline.
2. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 2 (2019),
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-YearAftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMA7-PC8E].
3. Brue Schneier, Opinion, Internet Hacking Is About to Get Much Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/opinion/internet-hacking-cybersecurity-iot.html.
4. CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN
REDUCING COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 7 (2019),
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/0c82d1e732eec64ff4cb3d4b7/files/d46d1d29-390d-48ec-ac9850c7e8600edc/2019_Class_Action_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/927U-P55R].
5. Id. at 13 (“More than half of legal decision-makers responsible for class actions believe data
privacy and security will be the next wave of class actions, up from less than 30 percent in 2017.”).
6. See Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.),
884 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2018) (District court separated the plaintiffs into two classes: plaintiffs who
“alleged that they had already suffered financial losses from identity theft” and those who had not already
suffered damages. On appeal, parties only contested whether the second group of plaintiffs lacked
standing. The Ninth Circuit seemed to agree there were not questions regarding standing for the first group
of plaintiffs); See also, Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Nobody doubts that
identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a[n] . . . injury.”).
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federal courts.7
This Article explores the aforementioned split and focuses on how two
recent cases have interpreted previous decisions on either side of the split.
Further, based on the recent rulings, this Article argues that the split may
be harmonized. Part II of this Article first sets forth the framework of the
standing doctrine. Next, Part II discusses two Supreme Court decisions,
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA8 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,9 that relate
directly to the standing doctrine and the current circuit split, along with
other background cases necessary for fully understanding the circuit split.
Part III compares two recent cases involved in the circuit split: Beck v.
Mcdonald10 and AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec.
Breach Litig.).11 Part IV argues that although Beck and AFGE fall on
opposite sides of the circuit split, together the cases illustrate that federal
courts have generally come to agreement on what factors are the most
important when deciding whether to grant standing for plaintiffs alleging
risk of future identity theft. Further, Part IV also proposes a framework
for courts to use that harmonizes the holdings of these different cases.
Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the above issues and
advocating that, moving forward, courts should follow the simplified
framework suggested.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part first introduces the standing doctrine and then introduces the
two major Supreme Court cases from the last decade, Clapper and
Spokeo, which provide guidance to lower courts for determining if
plaintiffs have standing in data breach cases. Although neither case’s facts
dealt specifically with a data breach, both cases discussed standing and
sought to clarify how courts should determine if a plaintiff had suffered
an injury in fact.
A. The Standing Doctrine
Article III of the United States Constitution grants federal courts with
“[t]he judicial Powers of the United States,”12 but limits the power to only

7. AFGE V. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

568 U.S. 398 (2013).
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
U.S. CONST. art. III §1.
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“Cases” and “Controversies.”13 “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in
the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.”14 The idea behind
a standing requirement is to “prevent the judicial process from being used
to usurp the powers of the [other] political branches.”15 Therefore,
plaintiffs must establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of
standing’s three elements.16
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff suffered an
injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed with a
favorable judicial ruling.17 The first element, injury in fact, must be “(a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’
or ‘hypothetical.’”18 Many times, the first standing element is the
prominent issue in data breach suits.19 Lastly, the plaintiff “bears the
burden of establishing standing” when it invokes federal jurisdiction.20
Meeting the burden on all three elements of standing allows the case to
be heard before the court.
B. Clapper v. Amnesty International21
Clapper dealt with a facial constitutional challenge to a new
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(“FISA”).22 More specifically, the plaintiffs sought to declare FISA
§1881a unconstitutional23. Essentially, FISA §1881a allowed the
government to more easily authorize foreign intelligence surveillance
without the traditional requirements of probable cause and similar
constraints.24 The plaintiffs were comprised of “organizations whose
work allegedly require[d] them to engage in sensitive and sometimes
privileged” communications with individuals who they believed to be

13. U.S. CONST. art. III §2.
14. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
15. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
16. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
17. Id. at 560, 561.
18. Id.
19. See Infra. Parts II, III.
20. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 412.
21. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
22. Id. at 407.
23. Id. at 404.
24. Id. at 405. (“Amendment Act . . . creat[es] a new framework under which the Government may
seek the FISC’s authorization of certain foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of
non-US persons located abroad. Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, §1881a does not require the
Government to demonstrate probable cause that the target [of surveillance] is a foreign power or agent …
does not require the Government to specify the nature and location of … surveillance.”).
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“likely targets of surveillance under [FISA] §1881a.”25 The plaintiffs’ two
main arguments were (1) “there [was] an objectively reasonable
likelihood that their communications [would] be acquired under §1881a
at some point in the future, thus causing them injury” and (2) the “risk of
surveillance” was “so substantial” the plaintiffs were “forced to take
costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality.”26
Initially, the district court held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing.27 Then, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision and agreed with the plaintiffs that there was an
objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications would be
intercepted.28 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s finding,
siding with the government in a 5-4 decision.29
The Court first ruled on the standing doctrine by taking issue with the
Second Circuit’s belief that “an objectively reasonable likelihood” of
future harm was sufficient to establish standing.30 Instead, the Court
reiterated that the “well-established requirement”31 for standing when
dealing with a future threated injury was that the injury must be “certainly
impending.”32 An objectively reasonable likelihood was considered too
low of a bar for standing.33
Further, the Court continued that the premise of the plaintiffs’
argument rested on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities” that relied
on independent actors making independent choices, of which the
plaintiffs could only speculate.34 This speculative chain of possibilities
further prevented the plaintiffs from satisfying the second element of
standing (i.e., that an injury in fact was fairly traceable to FISA §1881a).35
Lastly, in Clapper the Court also found issue with the plaintiffs’
alternative argument.36 The plaintiffs believed they had established
standing and an injury in fact because they were forced to suffer costs and
burdens in an effort to avoid FISA §1881a surveillance.37 Instead, the
Court clarified that the party bringing the action “cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id. at 411, 412.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415, 416.
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hypothetical future harm.”38 Effectively, the reasoning circles back to
whether the threat of injury passes the “certainly impending” test. If it
does not, then a plaintiff will not have standing because the injury cannot
simply be the costs and burdens incurred to avoid a threat that is not
“certainly impending.”
Interestingly, in a footnote, the Court noted that its cases “do not
uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that [plaintiffs are] literally
certain that the harms they identify will come about.”39 Further, the Court
stated “[i]n some instances, we have found standing based on a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”40 Later, in Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus41 (“SBA List”), the Court treated both the “certainly
impending” and “substantial risk” test as valid.42 Moreover, the Court in
SBA List seemed to rely on the substantial risk test.43
Since SBA List and Clapper, some courts have suggested the more
stringent “certainly impending” standard used in Clapper should be
applied to cases dealing with national security or separation of powers
issues, as was the case in Clapper.44 Overall, between the two cases, it is
clear that to pass the standing requirements, the Court will use one of the
two standards. The substantial risk standard is a lower bar for a plaintiff
to satisfy.45 Still, the facts and circumstances of the individual case will
likely determine which standard is used by courts. If the case involves
national security or other separation of powers issues, it is more likely
that courts will use the more restrictive “certainly impending” standard,
but the Court has not specifically clarified this conclusion.
C. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins46
The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Spokeo resulted in stricter

38. Id. at 416.
39. Id. at 410, n.5.
40. Id.
41. 573 U.S. 149 (2014).
42. Id. at 158.
43. See Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the
Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1334 (2017). “In Susan
B. Anthony the Court treated both tests in Clapper as valid . . . [t]he Susan B. Anthony decision appeared
to rely on the substantial risk test in concluding that ‘the threat of future enforcement of the false statement
statute [was] substantial.’” Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014)).
44. Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 884
F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Clapper’s standing analysis was “especially rigorous” because the case
arose in a sensitive national security context.”).
45. Mank, supra note 43, at 1333 (“[T]he Court had sometimes used a less strict “substantial risk”
test.”).
46. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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requirements for the first element of Article III standing: injury in fact.47
More specifically, Spokeo required that a plaintiff allege an injury that
was both “concrete and particularized.”48
The issue in Spokeo was whether a violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) gave the plaintiff
standing in federal court.49 The FCRA regulates companies that provide
information about consumers’ credit worthiness and imposes various
rules regarding the creation and use of consumer reports.50 One of those
rules is that such agencies must “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” of the information they collect and
produce.51 In its analysis, the Court treated Spokeo as a company
regulated under the FCRA.52 The plaintiff discovered that the information
Spokeo reported on his report was inaccurate, which constituted a
violation under the FCRA.53
The district court ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing because
he had not pled an injury in fact.54 The Ninth Circuit then reversed, finding
that a “violation of a statutory right [was] usually a sufficient injury in
fact to confer standing.” The Ninth Circuit further noted that there was
standing because the injury was particularized to the plaintiff
specifically.55
The Supreme Court’s analysis focused wholly on the injury in fact
requirement of standing. Specifically, the Court focused on what the
“particularized” and “concrete” elements of standing require.56 The Court
concluded that the “particularized” element meant the injury must be
personal and in an individualized manner, which means the plaintiff has
suffered “actual or threatened injury.”57 Importantly for data breach cases,
the Court included that a “threatened injury” potentially could satisfy the
“particularized” element. However, the Court emphasized that “concrete”
and “particularized” are not the same element.58 Instead, the two elements
have different characteristics, and both are required for a plaintiff to have

47. Id. at 1545.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1544.
50. Id. at 1545.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1546 (“Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a consumer reporting agency under FCRA.”)
(internal quotes omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (“Spokeo violated his statutory rights . . . not just other people[s] . . . because his personal
interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized.”) (internal quotations omitted).
56. Id. at 1548.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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standing.59
The Court continued by defining “concrete” injury as one that “must
actually exist” and must be “real, and not abstract.”60 The Court also
stated, however, that concrete does not necessarily mean tangible, and
instead noted that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”61
Both history62 and Congress play a pivotal role in shaping whether an
intangible harm creates an injury in fact.63 Congress may elevate an
intangible harm to the status of being a concrete injury by creating
statutory law.64 The result is that an intangible harm becomes a de facto
injury.65 Essentially, a statute can create standing for an otherwise
intangible harm. However, the Court warned that “a bare procedural
violation” without any other harm would not satisfy the injury in fact
requirement of standing.66 Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff may
not satisfy the concreteness element by alleging a bare procedural
violation.67 To illustrate, the Court used the example of an inaccurate zip
code.68 An inaccurately reported zip code would not alone cause harm to
a plaintiff, but it still technically would be inaccurate information and
therefore violate the statute. Although it is a procedural violation, an
inaccurate zip code would not constitute concrete harm. The Court
remanded the case and instructed the Ninth Circuit to determine whether
other types of false information would be considered a concrete harm.69
Altogether, the Spokeo decision offers guidance on the standing
jurisprudence in data breach cases in a few different ways. First, the injury
must be both concrete and particularized. If the individual has personally
suffered threatened injury, then the individual will likely satisfy the
“particularized” element. For the concrete element, statutory violations
help to confer standing for individuals. However, a statutory violation
must be more than a mere procedural violation. In dealing with future
harm, the Court suggested that a procedural violation must “entail a
degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”70 This

59. Id.
60. Id. (Internal quotations omitted).
61. Id. at 1549.
62. History is simply determining whether the harm has traditionally been considered adequate for
standing. “It is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a
harm that has traditionally been regard as providing a basis for a lawsuit in . . . courts.” Id. at 1549.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1550.
68. Id.
69. Id. at n.8.
70. Id. at 1550.
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means that the violation itself must at least potentially pose a genuine
harm to the person. If not, the plaintiff will likely be held not to have
standing.
D. The D.C. Circuit’s Prior Decision Considering Clapper and Spokeo
Since the Court’s decisions in Clapper and Spokeo, lower federal
courts remain split on the issue of whether future risk of identity theft is
sufficient to meet the standing requirements of Article III. Before the
discussion of the D.C. Circuit’s recent 2019 decision in AFGE v. OPM
(In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.)71 contained in Part III,
it is important to understand how the D.C. Circuit decided its first ruling
that dealt with a future harm of identity theft after the rulings in Clapper
and Spokeo.
1. Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.72
The Attias case arose out of a cyberattack against health insurer
CareFirst, Inc.73 In the cyberattack, customers’ personal information was
breached after CareFirst allegedly failed to encrypt its customer data.74
The plaintiffs’ causes of action included, inter alia, violations of various
state statutes, negligence, and breach of contract.75 The parties disagreed
over what the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged.76 Specifically at issue was
whether the complaint alleged theft of information that included social
security numbers and credit card numbers or merely customer names,
addresses, and subscriber ID numbers.77 The district court read the
complaint to not include social security and credit card information.78
Without these other forms of identifying data, the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate how the hackers could steal the plaintiffs’ identities.79
Therefore, the district court ruled that the injury was too speculative.80 In
other words, the district court found the injury in fact was not “actual or
imminent” because the hackers could not access these forms of
identifying data.81
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 623. In total the plaintiffs raised eleven different state-law causes of action. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and reversed the decision of the
district court.82 A few factors went into the court’s decision. First, the
district court erred by not reading the complaint to include social security
numbers and credit card numbers.83 The complaint alleged the business
collected all sorts of customer PII, and the plaintiffs’ defined PII to
include patient credit cards and social security numbers in the complaint.84
Therefore, since the court concluded that the complaint did include PII
necessary for identity theft, the complaint then also plausibly alleged the
breach could potentially expose customer information to identity theft.85
Secondly, the court believed the facts in the case were quite distinct from
Clapper, specifically because the plaintiffs’ alleged risks were not
contingent upon the happenings of a series of possible events.86 Here, the
hacker had already accessed the PII.87 Further, once the hack occurred,
the court said it was far less speculative to infer both the hacker’s intent
and ability to use the data for ill will.88 The court noted that “simply by
virtue of the hack and the nature of the data . . . taken” a substantial harm
existed.89
Lastly, the Attias court made an important distinction regarding
whether a plaintiff’s “self-imposed risk-mitigation costs” conferred
standing to the plaintiff.90 After the data breach, the plaintiffs alleged that
they reasonably spent money to protect their data by purchasing identity
theft protection and monitoring services.91 Further, the plaintiffs incurred
costs from time spent responding to the incident and monitoring their
credit and accounts afterwards.92 By quoting part of the Clapper decision,
the court concluded that “such self-imposed risk-mitigation costs, when
‘incurred in response to a speculative threat,’ do not fulfill the injury
requirement.”93 However, the court also noted that plaintiffs can use these
costs to “satisfy the redressability requirement, when combined with a
risk of future harm that is substantial enough to qualify as an injury in

82. Id.
83. Id. at 627.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 628.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 628-29. Quoting the seventh circuit, the court noted, “Why else would hackers break into
a . . . database and steal consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is sooner
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume the consumers’ identities.” Id. (quoting Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)).
89. Id. at 629.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416-17 (2013)).
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fact.”94 In this case, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that spending
money to protect against the threat was reasonable.95 Overall, the court’s
conclusion suggests that if the first element of standing—injury in fact—
is satisfied, then mitigation costs may be used to meet the third element
of standing—redressability.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since the two Supreme Court cases discussed in Part II and the D.C.
Circuit’s initial decision in Attias, the split has continued to be a highly
contested issue, as discussed more fully in this Section. First, this Section
examines the Fourth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Beck v. McDonald, where
the court refused to grant standing for a risk of future identity theft
claim.96 Then, this Section reviews the recent 2019 D.C. Circuit decision
in AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.),97 in
which the court granted standing based on a future risk of identity thief.98
Together, the cases illustrate the current legal landscape of the circuit split
by focusing on the similar factors the courts used when deciding when to
grant standing to potential future victims of identity theft.
A. Beck v. McDonald
The Beck decision dealt with two consolidated cases that arose out of
a laptop computer and pathology reports that were either misplaced or
stolen from a Veteran Affairs medical center.99 An internal investigation
found that the laptop was “likely stolen” and that the medical center
violated its own policies by leaving the client’s information stored on the
laptop unencrypted.100 The plaintiffs were veterans who received
treatment and healthcare from the VA medical center.101 The plaintiffs
alleged violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Administrative
Procedure Act.102 In response to the investigation, hospital officials
notified every patient whose information may have been on the laptop or
in the reports and offered a year of free credit monitoring to those possibly
affected by the breach.103 Unsatisfied, the plaintiffs sued and tried to
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017).
928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
See Section III.B.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id. at 267.
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establish standing through (1) their increased risk of future identity theft
and (2) the costs they incurred to protect themselves against identity
theft.104
After discovery, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III since
they had not “submitted evidence sufficient [to show] they faced a
‘certainly impending’ risk of identity theft.”105 Citing Clapper, the district
court agreed that the claims were “too speculative” because they were
“contingent on a claim of attenuated hypothetical events.”106 Specifically,
the district court said the fact that “33% of those affected by the laptop
theft would have their identities stolen” was not enough to demonstrate
“a substantial risk of identity theft” or pass the “lesser standard” of
“substantial risk.”107 Since the court considered the threat of future
identity theft merely speculative, it followed that the court believed that
the plaintiffs purchasing credit monitoring services “did not amount to an
injury-in-fact because they were taken solely ‘to mitigate speculative
harm.’”108
The Fourth Circuit conducted a de novo review of the district court’s
decision.109 After review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court
and held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.110 The focus of the
court’s inquiry was whether the plaintiffs met the first element of Article
III standing: injury in fact.111 The court analyzed two potential theories
proposed by the plaintiff for standing: “(1) increased risk of future identity
theft and (2) costs of protecting against the same” under both the certainly
impending standard and the “substantial risk” standard.112
In its analysis of the increased risk of future identity theft under the
certainly impending standard, the court specifically discussed the current
circuit split.113 In the court’s opinion, the facts of Beck were
distinguishable from the cases of other circuits that granted standing
based on future risk of identity theft because those cases had “common
allegations that sufficed to push the threatened injury of future identity
theft beyond the speculative to the sufficiently imminent.”114 As an
104. Id. at 266-67.
105. Id. at 268.
106. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 269.
110. Id. at 267.
111. Id. at 270.
112. Id. at 273.
113. Id. (noting the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits granting standing and the First and Third
Circuits denying standing).
114. Id. at 274.
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example, the court noted that in Galaria,115 Remijas,116 and Pisciotta,117
the hackers intentionally targeted the personal information that was stolen
in the data breach and at least one of the named plaintiffs had alleged
actual “misuse or access” to the personal information by the thief.118 In
Beck no such claims were made.119
In reaching its holding, the court stated (1) there was no evidence that
the PII stored on the laptop had been accessed and (2) the significant
amount of time that passed since the incident made the risk more
speculative.120 The court accepted the allegation that the laptop was
stolen, but said “the mere theft of [the laptop], without more, cannot
confer Article III standing.”121 Without more, the Fourth Circuit could not
“assume that the thief targeted the stolen items for the personal
information they contained.”122 Overall, it was clear the Fourth Circuit
was reluctant to grant the plaintiffs standing without more evidence that
illustrated the thief intended to misuse the stolen PII.
The court also held that the plaintiffs fell short of the burden under the
“substantial risk” standard.123 The plaintiffs alleged they faced a
substantial risk of future identity theft for three reasons: (1) a third of all
health-related data breaches resulted in identity theft; (2) the defendants
already spent millions to mitigate the future risk; and (3) the defendants
“effectively conceded” that the theft constituted a “reasonable risk”
because they offered plaintiffs free credit monitoring for a year.124 In its
“substantial risk” analysis, the court stated that statistics were insufficient
to establish a substantial risk of harm.125 Further, in a footnote, the court
demonstrated a reluctance to use general statistics because statistics are
not particularized to the case at issue.126 The court also declined “to infer
a substantial risk . . . from an organization’s offer to provide free credit
monitoring services,”127 even though other courts had come to the
opposite conclusion.128 Lastly, the court read Clapper to reject a
115. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
116. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2015).
117. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2015).
118. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 274-75.
121. Id. at 275.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 276.
126. Id. at 275-76, n.7 (“This general statistic says nothing about the risk arising out of any
particular incident, nor does it address the particular facts of this case”).
127. Id. at 276.
128. Id. Footnote 8 of Beck acknowledges Galaria and Remijas came to the opposite conclusion.
Id., n.8.
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“reasonable risk” as being sufficient to meet the imminent requirement of
an injury in fact.129
In the final part of its analysis, the court discussed whether costs of
mitigative measures incurred by plaintiffs could, by itself, confer
standing.130 The court highlighted the circularity that plagues the
reasoning to confer standing for this sole purpose, describing the claim as
merely “a repackaged version” of the substantial risk analysis.131
Essentially, the costs to mitigate the risks of future identity theft could
confer standing only if there was a substantial risk of the identity theft
occurring in the future. Therefore, costs of mitigating future damages, by
itself, “simply put … cannot confer standing.”132 In many ways, the
court’s reasoning echoed the Spokeo decision that came to the same
conclusion.
B. AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data sec. Breach Litig.)133
In June 2019, the D.C. Circuit again ruled on the circuit split. This time,
the case concerned a government agency data breach by hackers.134 The
data stolen included many types of sensitive information, such as
birthdates, social security numbers, and fingerprints.135 In total, the breach
affected over twenty-one million people.136
The agency at issue was the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”), which is the federal government’s chief human resources
agency and maintains the electronic personnel files of federal employees
and job applicants.137 Using stolen credentials from a third-party company
that helped the agency with its background checks, cyberattackers hacked
the network multiple times from 2013 to 2014.138 The cyberattacks were
described as “sophisticated, malicious, and carried out to obtain sensitive
information for improper use.”139 The OPM had experienced cyberattacks
since 2009 and had been warned of serious deficiencies in their security

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 276, 277 (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (2015)).
133. 928 F. 3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
134. Id. at 49.
135. Id. at 49-50. Other information included criminal histories, physiological and emotional health,
finances, residency details and passport information. It also included information about spouses and
cohabitants. Id.
136. Id. at 49.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 50.
139. Id. at 52.
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systems as far back as 2007.140 After announcing the breaches in 2015,
OPM offered fraud monitoring, identity theft protection services, and
insurance to those affected by the breach at no costs for either eighteen
months or three years.141
Despite the OPM’s offer, multiple suits arose across the country and
were consolidated into two complaints against OPM.142 One complaint
was brought by the American Federation of Government Employees
(“Arnold plaintiffs”) and second complaint was brought by three
members of the National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”).143
Arnold plaintiffs sought damages from OPM under Section 552a(e)(10)
of the Privacy Act of 1974, while NTEU sought declaratory and
injunctive relief and claimed a violation of their “constitutional right to
information privacy.”144
The district court dismissed both complaints for lack of standing.145
First, the district court did not believe a “risk of future identity theft was
either substantial or clearly impending” unless the plaintiffs experienced
“out-of-pocket losses” from the “actual misuse of their data.”146 Secondly,
even the plaintiffs who had their data actually misused lacked standing
because the misuse was not tracible to the OPM’s data breaches
particularly.147
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that both sets of plaintiffs “cleared the
low bar to establish their standing at the pleading stage.”148 The NTEU
plaintiffs claimed a constitutional right to “information privacy.”149 When
determining whether a plaintiff has standing, the court “must assume
arguendo, the merits of his or her legal claim.”150 Therefore, the court
assumed the NTEU plaintiffs had a right to information privacy. The court
thought this right was violated when the cyberattackers stole the personal
information of the plaintiffs.151 In its short analysis, the court concluded
140. Id. at 51. Further, in 2014 the Inspector General advised the agency to shut down the operating
system due to existing security vulnerabilities. Id.
141. Id. at 50. (stating the time of free services depended on whether the specific individual’s social
security number had been compromised in the data breach.).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 50-52. Arnold plaintiffs also brought claims against KeyPoint, the third-party company
OPM used to conduct a majority of its background and security clearance, but this Article will not discuss
those claims. Id. at 50-51.
145. Id. at 53.
146. Id. at 53.
147. Id. Essentially, there were possible alternatives beyond the OPM data breach that could have
led to the subsequent misuse of the plaintiffs’ data. Id.
148. Id. at 61 (quoting Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
149. Id. at 53.
150. Id. at 54 (citing Estate of Boyland v. Department of Agric., 913 F.3d 117, 123 (D.C. Cir 2019)).
151. Id.
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the nature of the constitutional claim granted standing to the NTEU
plaintiffs.152 On the other hand, the Arnold plaintiffs’ analysis was much
more involved. The opinion broke down its analysis by discussing each
of the three elements of standing.153 This Article’s analysis follows the
same format.
1. Injury in Fact
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis started by citing Attias as a reminder that
the risk of future identity theft was already recognized as a “concrete and
particularized injury.”154 However, based on Clapper and SBA List, the
injury must also be clearly impending or substantial.155 The court
compared the current case to Attias.156 In comparing the two cases, the
D.C. Circuit focused on two factors in particular: “both the intent and the
ability to use the data for ill (will).”157 The court concluded that in both
cases, the intent of the hacker and the nature of the data stolen made the
risk of future identity theft a substantial risk.158
The court reasoned that the ability to use data for ill will essentially
turned on the type of data that a hacker collected in its breach.159 After the
data breach, hackers had “in their possession all information needed to
steal the Arnold plaintiffs’ identities.”160 Based on the information taken,
“[i]t hardly [took] a criminal mastermind to imagine how such
information could be used to commit identity theft.”161 The Arnold
plaintiffs’ claims that some members already experienced forms of
identity theft further bolstered the plaintiffs’ inference that the nature of
the data stolen contained sufficient information to successfully steal
someone’s identity.162 Overall, combining the fact that the plaintiffs had
already suffered identity fraud with the “obvious potential” for future
fraud based on “the information stolen during the breaches” moved the
risk of future identity theft from speculative to substantial.163
The court’s intent analysis was premised on the Seventh Circuit’s
152. Id. at 55.
153. See supra Section II(A).
154. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 55.
155. Id. (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. at 55-58.
157. Id. at 56.
158. Id. at 58.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 56.
161. Id.
162. Id. (“several Arnold Plaintiffs also allege that unauthorized charges have appeared on their
existing credit card and bank account statements since the breaches.”).
163. Id. at 58.
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Remijas164 opinion, which determined that when a hacker breaks into a
database and steals private consumer information, the purpose “is, sooner
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’
identities.”165 The OPM argued that its case was different since (1) the
attack was against the United States government and (2) the hackers had
others goals which explained why the hackers wished to obtain the PII,
such as national security and espionage objectives.166 The court found two
problems with the OPM’s theories. First, the theories were based on the
district courts’ “own extra-record research” which was not allowed.167
Secondly, “espionage and identity theft [were] not mutually exclusive.”168
The court noted that, at the pleading stage, it was not appropriate to sort
out the most likely explanation for the hacker’s objective.169 Lastly, the
court explained that in scenarios like the current case, where the plaintiff’s
identity was already alleged to have been stolen, the importance of
proving the hackers intent “becomes markedly less important” because
possible damage from the breach had already manifested.170
The court used hacker intent and subsequent misuse of stolen
information to distinguish AFGE from the Third and Fourth Circuit
decisions that did not grant standing due to future risk of identity theft.171
In both of these cases that denied standing, the court concluded that (1)
neither plaintiff alleged the theft intentionally accessed the private
information and (2) there were no events of identity theft after the hack.172
In AFGE, the court said the plaintiff alleged both the hacker’s intention
and subsequent misuse.173
Lastly, the court’s analysis of Beck forced the court to consider whether
the time that elapsed since the breach should be considered as a factor,
along with intent and the nature of the data stolen. It agreed with Beck
that “as a general principle … as breaches fade further into the past,
threatened injuries become more and more speculative.”174 The dissent
believed that a gap of around two years between the attack and the

164. 794 F. 3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). Remijas was also a data breach case where the Seventh
Circuit granted standing to the plaintiffs based on a future risk of identity theft. In Remijas, hackers
attacked the department store Neiman Marcus Group and stole customer data. Approximately 350,000
cards were exposed to the hacker’s malware. Id. at 689-690.
165. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 56 (quoting Remijas 794 F.3d at 693).
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 58.
171. Id. at 58-59.
172. Id. at 58.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 59.
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subsequent misuse of the data was enough to “render the threat of future
harm insubstantial.”175 The majority, however, was not willing to
explicitly rule on the timing issue because (1) such “massive scale” data
breaches were a “relatively new phenomenon” and (2) the type of
Overall,
information
stolen
was
particularly
sensitive.176
“notwithstanding the passage of time and the governmental character of
the databases at issue,” the Arnold plaintiffs still offered enough evidence,
at least at this stage in the proceeding, to demonstrate a substantial risk of
future identity theft.177
2. Causation
The D.C. Circuit overruled the district court’s finding that the Arnold
plaintiffs did not meet the causation element of standing.178 Instead, the
court had “little difficulty concluding” that the plaintiffs met their
“relatively modest burden” of alleging traceability to the OPM data
breach.179 Initially, the district court said the plaintiffs did not allege “any
facts that plausibly connect” the misuse of the stolen data to the breaches
of the OPM systems.180 However, the circuit court clarified that the
district court used the wrong premise. For future risk of identity theft
injury claims, instead of focusing on past attacks, the question is whether
the injury is fairly traceable to the risk of future identity theft.181 Here, the
data had been stolen, and the OPM had failed to secure its information
systems, despite repeated warnings by the General Inspector.182 Further,
the data stolen was enough by itself to enable several forms of identity
theft.183 Together, the court found all of these reasons sufficient to meet
the causation burden for standing by holding that the a future risk of
identity theft was traceable to the OPM.184
3. Redressability
The D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs could satisfy the redressability
element by receiving compensation for their related mitigation expenses,

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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if the plaintiff were to prevail on their claim.185 In AFGE, the related
mitigation expenses were the costs the plaintiffs incurred to monitor their
credit.186 The court cited Attias and used its logic that plaintiffs may be
redressed for their monetary costs spent to protect themselves against a
future risk as long as the spending was reasonable and the potential risk
was substantial.187 The court already ruled that the potential risk was
substantial in its injury in fact analysis. Therefore, the money plaintiffs
spent to protect against identity theft was able to satisfy the redressability
element. Since all three elements of standing were met by the plaintiffs,
the court ruled that the plaintiffs “cleared the low bar to establish their
standing at the pleading stage.”188
IV. DISCUSSION
Together, the Beck and AFGE cases demonstrate how and why the
federal circuit courts may fall on opposite sides of the split. The split
remains highly contested in part due to a fear that granting standing to
plaintiffs based on a future risk of identity theft will open the floodgates
to massive class action litigation every time a data breach occurs.189
However, taken together, the Beck and AFGE cases also illuminate the
similarity of the factors that federal circuit courts use to decide whether
to grant standing based of the risk of future identity theft. This Section
shows that the factors the courts are weighing in these cases are the same
regardless of how the courts ultimately rule. By using the factors that the
federal circuit courts have already been using to justify their holdings,
courts may be able to set a more cognizable threshold standard for
standing in these types of cases. By doing so, courts will not need to turn
away all plaintiffs who have been potentially injured while also avoiding
a complete opening of the floodgates to litigation anytime there is a data
breach. Instead, it is the facts and circumstances of each case, weighed
with the factors the courts have already been using, that should determine
whether or not a plaintiff is granted standing due to a risk of future identity
theft. Next, this Section discusses the common factors used by the courts
and explains how the factors are viewed similarly by the different courts.
Last, this section proposes a line of questioning courts should adopt when
deciding whether it is appropriate to grant standing based on a future risk

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Omer Tene, Neiman Marcus May Open the Floodgates for Breach Lawsuits, INT’L ASS’N OF
PRIVACY PROFS. (IAPP) (Jul. 24, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/neiman-marcus-may-open-thefloodgates-for-breach-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/Y9EB-YQXB].
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of identity theft.
A. Intent of the Theft
In analyzing standing, the Beck and AFGE courts prioritized discussing
the intent of the theft. Also, both cases approvingly cited to Remijas’
language that “the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make
fraudulent charges.”190 Ultimately, this language suggests that “bad
intent” may be implied in a traditional computer system hacking case.
However, the language of Remijas is specific to a hack, and not all risk of
future identity theft claims result from a stereotypical hack. There are also
cases such as Beck that involve the theft of something tangible that may
also threaten individuals’ PII. For example, similar facts could arise from
a stolen cell phone. In Beck, the court looked at the Sixth,191 Seventh,192
and Ninth193 Circuit decisions that granted standing and specifically
distinguished those case by noting the Beck theft did not possess the same
intent that could be inferred from the stereotypical information systems
hacks that were prevalent in the aforementioned cases.194 In cases where
intent cannot be implied simply by the act of the hack itself, something
else is needed to confer the malicious intent of the hacker.
Both AFGE and Beck naturally looked next to whether any of the
alleged victims’ PII had been wrongfully used. This is a logical next
question to ask because, if PII was wrongfully used, then it again makes
sense to infer that the thief stole the information to use it for wrongful
purposes. In cases like Beck, it may be unclear whether the thief stole the
laptop to sell the laptop itself and make money, or if the thief stole the
laptop for the purpose of using the PII the thief knew was stored on the
laptop. Clearly, the latter scenario is much more likely to lead to future
identity theft than the former. Generally, both sides of the split seem to
agree that intent may be inferred through the breach itself in most
situations where a traditional information systems breach occurs. If,
however, the facts and circumstances of the specific incident do not make
this inference clear, courts should next look to whether any victims’ PII
has already been wrongfully used. If misuse has occurred, courts may
infer that, at a minimum, one of the hacker’s goals was to misuse the
information, which again allows courts to infer a substantial risk.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017); AFGE, 928 F.3d at 56.
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016).
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015).
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
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B. Type of Information Stolen
Both Beck and AFGE also looked at the type of information that was at
risk of being used incorrectly to determine whether the future risk of
identity theft was substantial. Often, a significant amount of PII obtained
through the theft may already have been freely available through other
methods, such as the public domain. For example, names and addresses
are often already in the public domain through public records. Even
information such as someone’s occupation or date of birth may be
available from credit reports or social media websites such as Facebook
or LinkedIn. The Spokeo Court specifically suggested (in the case of a
statutory violation) that information such as a person’s zip code may not
satisfy the concreteness demands of Article III because an inaccurate zip
code alone was not a risk of real harm.195
In the Eighth Circuit’s In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation196 decision, the court held that credit card information,
with no other PII stolen, is not enough to confer standing under Article
III.197 In that case, the court focused particularly on the types of PII data
stolen to determine whether plaintiffs had standing.198 Essentially, the
type of information stolen determines whether the degree of risk is
sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement of standing.
In Beck and AFGE, social security numbers were amongst the types of
information stolen.199 Social security numbers, unlike zip codes, are
generally considered incredibly private and often unlock the ability to
perform a plethora of financial activities such as opening, closing, and
accessing bank accounts, credit cards, and loans. From a practical
standpoint, a stolen social security number is a much larger burden on
potential victims because social security numbers are much harder PII to
change once they are compromised. The AFGE court viewed social
security numbers, in addition to the surmountable other types of PII
stolen, as sufficient to allow the simple inference that the type of
information stolen in the breach was adequate to successfully commit
identity theft.200 The Beck court did not specifically comment on whether
it believed the information on the laptop was sensitive enough to imply a
risk is of future harm. However, the Beck court also did not attack the
reasoning of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit courts which did infer
195. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549-50 (2016).
196. 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
197. Id. at 771-72. (stating that credit card information was insufficient to support standing.
Importantly, in that case, no other PII was allegedly stolen.).
198. Id. at 769-71.
199. Beck, 848 F.3d at 268; AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928
F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
200. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 60.
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that the information stolen was sufficiently sensitive. Instead, Beck
focused on the intent of the hacker to distinguish the cases.201 Therefore,
between the two cases, it appears that social security numbers, along with
some other types of stolen PII, are concrete enough to qualify as injury in
fact. However, the Beck court’s reasoning seemed to prioritize the thief’s
intent over the type of PII stolen by the thief.202
C. Timing
Perhaps the most controversial factor that the courts considered in Beck
and AFGE was the role that the passage of time plays as a factor for
determining whether a future risk is substantial. In their respective
opinions, both circuit courts agreed that “as a general principle … as
breaches fade further into the past … threatened injuries become more
and more speculative.”203 The courts’ statements on timing suggest that
both courts understood timing to minimally be a factor worthy of
consideration by courts, before either granting or denying standing.
Although there may be an inferred agreement that courts believe timing
should be a factor, both courts’ opinions offer minimal guidance for
understanding how significant of a factor the respective courts believe
timing should be when deciding whether a plaintiff has standing.
The Beck opinion noted it had been over three years since the initial
data breaches and still no evidence existed of actual identity theft.204 Since
the thief in Beck was not a traditional information systems hack, but
instead involved the theft of a laptop, the court could not infer the thief’s
intent by the act of the theft itself, like it suggested one could with cases
involving a traditional data hack.205 The court then used the passage of
time as a detrimental fact against the plaintiffs. The court believed the
prolonged timespan between the theft and the case, without an incident of
identity theft, made the inference that the thief’s intent was to use the PII
for identity theft a much more speculative inference. Essentially, the Beck
court used the passage of time as a weighing factor when intent of the
thief could not be inferred by the act of the theft itself.
Lastly, it should be noted that the Beck court only discussed passage of
time under its “certainly impending” analysis.206 In many ways, it makes
sense that the passage of time may play a larger role determining whether
a plaintiff has standing in cases that involve the stricter “certainly
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274-75.
Id.
AFGE, 928 F.3d at 59. (quoting Beck, 848 F.3d at 275).
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274-75.
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impending” standard, compared to the more laxed “substantial risk”
standard. Under the Clapper analysis, it is evident that at least part of what
makes “certainly impending” a higher bar for plaintiffs to pass is that
there in an immediacy to something being “certainly impending” as
opposed to there merely being a “substantial risk” of something
happening in the future.
The AFGE court analyzed the passage of time factor under facts that
the court believed allowed it to infer intent of the theft by the act of the
hack itself. Therefore, the AFGE court examined timing as an
independent factor, instead of merely being a factor used to infer a thief’s
intent, like the Beck court did. Although the court still admitted passage
of time played some role in determining a future risk of identity theft,
overall the court was reluctant to give the factor much weight. First, the
court mostly declined to analyze the issue by stating it believed it was too
early to make a determination regarding timing because of the large scale
of the data breach and the relative novelty of large-scale data breaches,
generally.207 Essentially, the court believed it did not possess enough
knowledge about the general workings of data breaches and therefore did
not want to make any substantive rulings on data breaches related to how
the passage of time may or may not affect the substantiality of the risk of
future identity theft. Second, the only significant position the court held
on timing at all was that it was unpersuaded that two years between the
cyberattacks and the lawsuit was a long enough passage of time to make
the threat insubstantial.208 All in all, AFGE did acknowledge that the
passage of time may play a role in the standing analysis but limited the
factor by (1) stating two years was not a long enough passage of time to
affect the analysis, and (2) showing a general reluctance to giving the
factor much weight.209
D. Certainly Impending v. Substantial Risk: Which Standard Applies?
The previously discussed factors of intent, timing, and type of PII
stolen from the theft likely allow for much more elastic inferences when
analyzed under the “substantial risk” standard versus the “certainly
impending” standard. Since Clapper, courts have suggested the certainly
impending test may only relate to matters of national security or facial
challenges.210 Courts’ treatment of the two standards since Clapper
unquestionably shows a willingness to use the substantial risk standard in
207. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 59.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 884
F.3d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2018).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/9

22

Steffel: Time Between Theft and Injury

2020]

TIME BETWEEN THEFT AND INJURY

1211

lieu of its alternative.211 The Supreme Court could clarify when each
standard is preferred by granting a writ of certiorari on a related case.
Without a Supreme Court clarification, appellate courts have consistently
shown a respect for the substantial risk standard by often using the
standard for their standing analyses. It is almost impossible for
individuals to know exactly when their PII may become compromised
after a data breach. Further, it is also nearly impossible for a victim to
know whether a thief intends to misuse their PII or what a thief’s
comprehension skills are for both understanding and wrongfully using an
individual’s data. Due to an alleged victim’s inability to know these facts,
it is logical, in most cases, to apply the more lenient standard when
determining standing. Lastly, the SBA List decision following Clapper
also further illustrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to use the more
lenient substantial risk standard. Together, these factors make the
substantial risk standard the desired standard for courts to use when
determining standing based on a future risk of identity theft.
E. Resulting Standard for Courts Moving Forward
Using the factors previously discussed, the circuit courts’ rulings in
Beck and AFGE offer guidance for other courts to analyze the circuit split
without simply granting or denying standing in all cases involving a future
risk of identity theft. In fact, the cases demonstrate that as circuit courts’
jurisprudence on the split has continued to evolve, consistent factors have
arisen in appellate decisions and may now be synthetized and used to
analyze the split henceforward. The following is an order of questions
courts should ask to determine if a plaintiff has standing based on a future
risk of identity theft.
First, a court must figure out which standard to apply: “certainly
impending” or “substantial risk.” Based on Clapper, courts know that if
there is a question of national security or a separation of powers question
at issue, courts should apply the certainly impending standard. A question
of separation of powers is more likely to arise in a case that facially
challenges a statute. Naturally, a facial challenge positions a court against
a decision by Congress. In an effort to show deference to the decisions of
Congress, it makes sense to require that plaintiffs pass a stricter standing
requirement in those cases. Based on a broader implementation of
Clapper, the certainly impending standard could be required in any cases
involving the federal government. However, AFGE involved a federal
government agency and the court did not require plaintiffs to pass the

211. As previously discussed, SBA List, Attias, AFGE, Remijas, and Zappos.com, Inc. all use the
“substantial risk” standard in their analyses.
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stricter certainly impending standard. Therefore, moving forward, other
courts should follow suit and freely apply the substantial risk standard in
all cases that do not involve national security or separation of powers
issues, like the Supreme Court did in SBA List.
After deciding which standard applies, the type of information stolen
serves as a gateway to the rest of the standing analysis. Both Beck and
AFGE dealt with the theft of social security numbers along with other
types of identifying PII. Taking a holistic view, courts need to simply ask
if the type of PII stolen, judged altogether, allow for a relatively
competent thief to commit identity theft. After Beck and AFGE, courts
should consider social security numbers with minimal other PII sufficient
for a relatively competent theft to commit identity theft. Whether credit
card numbers or bank account numbers along with other pieces of PII pass
the same test is likely dependent on the facts and circumstances of the
theft and the intent of the thief.
Next, courts should turn to analyzing the intent of the thief. Based on
Beck’s and AFGE’s favorable treatment of the logic used in Remijas, if
the theft occurred via a traditional data hack, ill-will on behalf of the
hacker may be implied. If the theft occurred by means other than a data
hack, then courts should next determine whether some of the alleged
victims’ information was actually misused after the theft. In AFGE, later
actual misuse was a supporting factor for the plaintiffs. In Beck, no
evidence of a later misuse was a negating factor for the plaintiffs. Overall,
if PII was stolen, and later misused, then standing should be granted.
On the other hand, if there has not been any later misuse, courts should
then turn to the passage of time factor. The AFGE court examined the
passage of time as a possible independent factor. But by stating that the
court did not believe it was in a position to substantially rule on timing,
due to the relatively contemporaneous nature of large-scale data breaches,
the effect was to essentially neuter the factor of any persuasive weight.
However, the Beck analysis may offer a more natural fit for where to
structure timing as a factor in the overall standing analysis; timing is best
examined when the thief’s intent cannot be easily inferred by the act. If a
significant time has passed since the act, no misuse of the information has
been reported by any of the plaintiffs, and the intent of the thief may not
be inferred based on the type of theft, then courts should follow the
decision of the Beck court and not grant standing to the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the above guidance, questions still persist regarding
how to best determine when the passage of time becomes significant.
Neither the Beck nor AFGE decision provides much guidance for how to
determine when the amount of time elapsed since a theft becomes
significant. Based on AFGE, two years may not be enough time to be
considered significant, at least when dealing with a large-scale data
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breach that potentially affects millions of people’s PII. The laptop in Beck
was stolen about three and a half years prior to when the Fourth Circuit
heard the case and affected approximately 7,400 patients.212 Together, it
may be deduced that the passage of time factor may be elastic, depending
on the amount of PII stolen and people affected. As guideposts, two years
may not be long enough, but more than three years could be considered a
significant amount of time.
V. CONCLUSION
As the number of data breaches in the United States continue to rise,
surely so will the amount of litigation concerning how to best make
victims of subsequent identity theft whole. As individuals continue to
adapt to the rapidly progressing digital age, individuals will become even
more keenly aware of the potential financial risks that threaten them after
their PII is stolen. People who find out their PII has been compromised
will likely continue to file claims against the entities who failed to protect
their PII.
Those realities put federal courts in a tough spot: do federal courts flood
the courts by encouraging individuals to take proactive measures to
protect themselves from potentially significant financial losses and grant
standing based off of a future risk of identity theft? Or do courts protect
the judicial systems from a flood of litigation dealing with the growing
issue by not granting standing to plaintiffs until actual identity theft
occurs? The Supreme Court has not directly resolved this issue.
Thankfully though, recent decisions falling on either side of the circuit
split have provided guidance as to what factors matter most when federal
courts resolve cases based on a future risk of identity theft. The type of
information stolen and the thief’s intent have surfaced as the two most
important factors. Furthermore, within intent, courts may look to whether
identity theft has already occurred amongst the plaintiffs and the passage
of time to determine if the risk is “certainly impending” or a “substantial
risk.” By potentially leaving the door to litigation open, one may argue
that the courts will still be swamped with litigation. However, by adopting
the framework of questions discussed in Section IV, courts should be able
to clarify the factors and effectively limit the amount of overall litigation
on the subject, while still allowing plaintiffs who proactively incurred
costs to mitigate future damages the ability to be made whole for costs
they responsibly incurred.

212. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
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